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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CHRISTIAN H. MAYFIELD,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 950835-CA

Priority ,No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JPRISPICTION ANP NATPBB OF PRQCSEPINSS
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
motion to suppress in a case in which defendant was charged
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5
(1996), in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Box
Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to review this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the

initial stop of the car defendant was operating was
justified?

"In absence of clear error, the trial court's

findings of fact underlying its decision to grant or deny
the suppression motion must be upheld."

Provo City v.

Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992)(citations
omitted), aff'd. 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), "However, as for
the trial court's legal conclusions in regards thereto, the
correction of error standard applies."

Id. (applying this

standard to the correctness of a vehicle stop under the
community caretaker doctrine)(citations omitted).
2.

Should this Court reverse a trial court ruling,

dispositive of the issue on appeal, which defendant has not
challenged on appeal?

This Court will accept the findings

of the trial court unchallenged by the defendant on appeal.
State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah App.
1995)(refusing to consider the trial court's finding that a
consent to search was voluntary, unchallenged on appeal).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A:
Fourth Amendment
Utah Code Ann. §
Utah Code Ann. §
Utah Code Ann. §

to the United States Constitution;
41-6-61(1) (1993);
41-6-182 (1993);
41-la-1101 (1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Christian H. Mayfield, was charged with two
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substances and
one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (R.
1-2).

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in a

warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion
(R. 21, 27-29).

Defendant petitioned for interlocutory

appeal, and this Court granted the petition (R. 32).
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 19, 1995, at about 2:15 p.m., Trooper Scott
Singleton of the Utah Highway Patrol was alone on patrol,
driving south on 1-15 near the port of entry in Box Elder
County (R. 43-44, 47). In front of him in the lefthand lane
he saw defendant's car and watched defendant, the driver of
the car, attempt to fasten his seat belt.

As defendant

reached for the seat belt the car weaved across the fog line
and then corrected back onto the highway (R. 4 4 ) . Trooper
Singleton followed defendant for about one-half mile without
incident, at which point the trooper pulled the car over,
intending to warn the driver that in future he should either
pull over or secure his seat belt before operating his car
(R. 44, 66) .
Trooper Singleton approached the car and asked
defendant for his license and registration (R. 44-45).
Defendant said that he did not have a valid license, and he
did not produce a registration (R. 45) -1

He also told the

trooper that he had a warrant out on him2 and that he was to
report to the Davis County Jail before 5:00 p.m. (R. 45,
1

Only later, after the search, did Trooper Singleton find
the registration in the trunk of the car, and, apparently only
then, did Trooper Singleton run a check which revealed that the car
had not been stolen (R. 54-55, 72).
2

Trooper Singleton acknowledged that he was unable to find
an outstanding warrant on defendant, though the context of the
comment seems to indicate that he did not do a warrants check until
after the ensuing search of the car: "He said there was a warrant,
but I never found one. I went over to the passenger side and asked
him to step out . . . ." (R. 45).
3

77).

Trooper Singleton then asked defendant to step out of

the car and then frisked him (R. 45, 56) .3 Thereafter, the
trooper asked defendant if the passenger, Jeffrey Cummings,
had a valid license.

When defendant answered affirmatively,

Trooper Singleton asked defendant to return to the driver's
seat, and then stepped to the other side of the car to
approach the passenger (R. 45). Believing that he would be
requesting that Cummings drive the car away, Trooper
Singleton asked Cummings to exit the car, frisked him for
safety reasons and asked him for identification (R. 45, 6770, 75-76, 79).
As Cummings handed over his driver's license, Trooper
Singleton noticed that Cummings' hands trembled so unusually
badly and that he appeared so extraordinarily nervous, that
he (Singleton) became nervous himself and became suspicious
about the presence of weapons or contraband (R. 45-46, 5657, 60-61).

In order to alleviate hsi concerns, the trooper

asked Cummings if there were any weapons or contraband in
the car.

Cummings answered that there were none (R. 46).

The trooper then returned to defendant, informing him
that Cummings' behavior was making him "uneasy," and
"nervous," and so asked defendant if there were any weapons
or contraband in the car (R. 46). When defendant said there
3

Trooper Singleton's Warrantless Arrest Probable Cause
Statement ("report"), to which Singleton referred on crossexamination, indicates that the pat down did not uncover any
weapons (R. 3), but that fact was not put before the trial court.
4

were none in the car, Trooper Singleton asked if he could
look for weapons or contraband (R. 47, 58). Defendant's
immediate response was to explain away Cummings'
nervousness, stating that his companion always got nervous
(R. 58-59).

The trooper restated his concern about

Cummings' abnormal behavior and again asked if he could look
in the car for weapons or contraband (R. 59). Apparently
receiving no answer,4 the trooper asked defendant if there
was a weapon in the car, and defendant answered there was
not (R. 59). When asked if he minded the trooper's looking
in the car, defendant answered, *I don't care" (R. 59-60).
Trooper Singleton then had defendant stand in front of
the car while he searched it (R. 47) .5 Between the front
seats he found a metal pipe, which, in the officer's
experience, was used for smoking marijuana and a plastic
prescription bottle containing marijuana (R. 47-48, 50). On
the floor on the passenger's side he found a fanny pack
containing a large knife and a package of cigarettes (R. 4849).

Within the cellophane of the cigarette package there

was a small baggie containing a whitish substance which
4

When led by defense counsel to say that defendant had not
answered after having again been asked if the trooper could look
for weapons or contraband, Trooper Singleton answered, "I believe
that's correct, if that's in the report" (R. 59). The report,
however, makes no mention that defendant did not respond to the
trooper's question (R. 3).
5

Trooper Singleton acknowledged that at this point, after
speaking with defendant about Cummings' nervousness and having
defendant also stand at the front of the car, that neither
defendant nor Cummings were free to leave (R. 57-58) .
5

appeared to be methamphetamine (R. 49). Cummings said the
fanny pack was his, and Trooper Singleton arrested him for
possession of a controlled substance.

As the trooper

handcuffed Cummings, defendant approached the trooper and
said that the fanny pack was his, whereupon Trooper
Singleton arrested him also. After taking both men into
custody, the trooper continued his search, finding inside a
day planner, which Cummings had left on the roof of the car,
another small bag containing a crushed whitish substance
which also appeared to be methamphetamine (R. 49, 51, 73).
The trooper also found another baggie containing what
appeared to be marijuana between the passenger seat cushions
(R. 49-50).

All items tested positive for marijuana and

methamphetamine (R. 50). At the jail, Trooper Singleton also
issued defendant a warning for an improper lane change (R.
60) .

SUMMARY OF ACUMEN!
POINT I
The trooper's stop of the car defendant was driving was
justified because the trooper observed defendant committing
traffic violations by swerving off the road while unlawfully
attempting to fasten his seat belt.

The stop was also

justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the
trooper stopped the car to warn defendant of the danger of
operating a vehicle while fastening a seat belt.

6

POINT II
The trial court ruled that the search of the car was
valid as an inventory search after finding on a legitimate
ground for impounding the car.

On appeal defendant does not

discuss or challenge this conclusion.

Therefore, the Court

should summarily affirm the trial court's conclusion.
AEGPMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
INITIAL STOP OF DEPENDANT'S CAR WAS JUSTIFIED
EITHER BY DEFENDANT'S TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS OR BY THE
OFFICER'S REASONABLE ACTION UNDER THE COMMUNITY
CARETAKER DOCTRINE
Relying on State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), defendant
challenges the trial court's finding that the initial stop
was justified.

Defendant argues that he did not commit a

traffic violation under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1) (1993) in
the officer's presence, and the initial stop of the car was
not justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Aplt's Br. at 811.

BallQ, however, is factually distinguishable from this

case.

Moreover, the focus of the prosecutor's argument and

Trooper Singleton's testimony plainly suggest that the trial
court found the initial stop justified not only by a traffic
violation, but also by the community caretaker doctrine, a
basis for the trial court's decision which defendant does
not even address on appeal.
7

A.

The Initial Stop was Justified by the
Trooper's Observation of Two Traffic Violations.

"In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
State must establish that the stop in question was . . .
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's
presence . . . ."fifillQ,871 P.2d at 586; see alSQ State v.
Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(same).
In Bello. a driver was stopped because the car he was
driving momentarily weaved out of its lane.
at 585.

Bello, 871 P.2d

This Court held the traffic stop invalid because

section 41-6-61 (l)6 requires a driver to operate his vehicle
within a single lane "as nearly as practical."

Id. at 587.

However, the driver in Bella was driving a truck with a
camper shell in extremely windy conditions, a circumstance
beyond the driver's complete control, which this Court found
very significant.

Id.

Further bolstering the Court's view

was the officer's failure to observe any other deviations
from a normal driving pattern while following the truck for
more than two miles after first observing the truck drift
across the lane markers.

Id.

Based on these facts, the

Court found that uthe single instance of weaving . . . could
6

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1)(1993), provides:

On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked
lanes for traffic the following provisions apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical
entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from
the lane until the operator has determined the movement
can be made safely.
8

not constitute a violation of section 41-6-61(1) and
therefore cannot serve as the constitutional basis for
stopping Bello's truck.'' Id.
In this case defendant also only momentarily drifted
out of his lane (R. 44, 66). However, unlike the defendant
in Bello. defendant in this case was not at the mercy of the
elements, but rather violated section 41-6-61(1) as a result
of violating another statute, i.e., the seat belt
requirement.7

In other words, the defendant in Bello could

not "practically" have avoided a technical violation of the
statute given road conditions that were entirely beyond his
control.

Defendant in this case, however, was not subjected

to forces beyond his control.

Rather, by reaching for his

seat belt while operating the car, he created the conditions
that led to his lack of control, conditions which themselves
evidenced a violation of another statute.

Additionally,

unlike the officer in Bello. the trooper in this case
witnessed how one violation generated the other.

In sum,

defendant plainly, volitionally, violated section 41-661(1).

£££ Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (wxWhen an officer

observes a traffic offense--however minor--he has probable
cause to stop the driver of the vehicle'")(quoting United
States v. Cummins. 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.

7

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182(2) (1993), provides, in part that
"the driver and front seat passengers of a motor vehicle operated
on a highway shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety
belt system . . . ."
9

denied. 502 U.S. 962 (1991)).

Based on his observation,

Trooper Singleton properly stopped and cited defendant for
the violation (R. 60), which the trial court correctly
recognized as a justifiable basis for the stop (See
Memorandum Decision, R. 27-29, attached at Addendum B ) .
B.

The Initial Stop was Justified Under

the cpinpwEiity Caretaker ppctrineThe propriety of a automobile stop under the community
caretaker doctrine is ultimately a question of
"reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360,

363-64 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994).
In Provo City, two men approached a police officer and
informed him that a man had just asked them where he could
buy some cocaine so he could Mrive himself into a wall."
Id. at 361.

From the car's description and the licence

plate number given to him, the officer located the car,
followed it briefly without observing any traffic violations
and then stopped it only out of concern for the driver's
welfare.

Smelling alcohol on the defendant's breath, the

officer administered field sobriety tests, which the
defendant failed, and arrested the defendant for driving
under the influence.

Id.

Recognizing that *'[i]t would be too extravagant to
contend that a benign purpose of rendering assistance could
never justify the stop of a motorist," Provo City, 844 P.2d
at 363 (quoting United States v. Dunbar. 470 F. Supp. 704,
10

707 (D. Conn.), aff'd. 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1979)), this
Court upheld the stop, notwithstanding the absence of anyreasonable suspicion of criminal activity, under the
community caretaker doctrine.

Id. at 365.

In so ruling,

the Court adopted the following test to determine the
justifiability of a welfare stop:
The trial court must evaluate the legitimacy of an
alleged community caretaker stop as follows:
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based
upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function—under the given circumstances, would a
reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a
purpose consistent with community caretaker
functions? Third, based upon an objective
analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an
imminent danger to life or limb?
Id. at 364 (citing Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1046) .
Applying this test, the trial court correctly
determined that defendant's stop was justified.8

8

First,

The trial court's finding that the initial stop was
justified is not by its terms founded more deliberately on the
community caretaker doctrine than it is on the traditional basis
for a stop, i.e., traffic violation or suspicion of criminal
activity, but the circumstances of the case and the focus of the
argument plainly suggest that the decision was also based M on the
community caretaker doctrine. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130 ( [w]hen
a trial court has failed to make findings of fact on the record, we
will "assume that the [trial court
found facts] in accord with its
decision' whenever it would be %reasonable to assume that the court
actually made such findings'")(quoting State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d
774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)).
At the suppression hearing Trooper Singleton testified that he
stopped defendant after he observed the car defendant was driving
weave over the fog line and then correct itself as defendant
attached his seat belt (R. 44). However, the trooper acknowledged
that his purpose in stopping defendant was to warn him about the
need to attach his seat belt before operating the car (R. 66) . The
principal thrust of the prosecutor's argument was that the stop was
11

Trooper Singleton acknowledged that defendant and Cummings
were not free to leave when he detained them out of concern
for the presence of weapons or contraband (R. 57-58).
Second, any reasonable police officer, having witnessed the
car weave off the roadway due to defendant's loss of control
while buckling his seat belt, would have stopped defendant
to warn him of the danger of his actions.

Moreover, the

record is undisputed that Trooper Singleton did not stop
defendant for any criminal investigatory purpose.

Police

officers are hired precisely for the purpose of protecting
citizens, entirely apart from any criminality, by warning
them that their actions might be dangerous to themselves and
others.

See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 ("Police officers are

under a duty to enforce the traffic laws.").

Third,

defendant's momentary loss of vehicle control demonstrated
an obvious, imminent safety hazard, both to himself and to
anybody he might have hit as a result of weaving.

It is

plain that *imminent danger" does not contemplate a

justified for safety purposes under the community caretaker
doctrine (R. 97-98).
The trial court specifically found that
*[t]he vehicle was stopped and the driver advised of the danger of
attaching a seat belt during the operation of a vehicle" (R. 27).
Given the prosecutor's reliance on the community caretaker
doctrine, the trooper's testimony, and the trial court's finding,
it must be assumed that the trial court's ruling was also based on
the community caretaker doctrine. Even if it was not, this Court
should consider that theory as an alternative argument to affirm
the trial court's ruling. See State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344
n.4 (Utah App.
1991)(stating the reviewing court may affirm the
trial courtfs ruling on any proper ground). The Court should note
that defendant has entirely failed to address this ground of the
trial court's ruling, and therefore should accept its conclusion
that the initial stop was justified. See Aple's Br. at 12-13.
12

necessary outcome in the immediate future, since the test
was satisfied in Provo City by an encounter in which an
alleged suicide-in-the-making had not yet materialized when
the officer finally discovered the driver after the passage
of some time following the officer's first learning of the
matter.

Provo City. 844 P.2d at 361, 365.

In this case it

was reasonable to assume that a driver who was once observed
fastening his seat belt while driving would likely do so
again the next time he drove, possibly with more unfortunate
results.

In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that

Trooper Singleton's stopping defendant was justified under
the community caretaker doctrine.
POINT II
BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE TRIAL
COURT#S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIABLY
DETAINED FOR LACK OF LICENSE AND REGISTRATION OR
ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE LACK OF REGISTRATION
PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR IMPOUNDING AND,
THEREFORE, SEARCHING THE CAR, THIS COURT SHOULD
ACCEPT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
In support of his suppression motion, defendant argued
that his continued detention following the initial stop was
unjustified because a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity could not be based on Cummings' show of
nervousness.

In support of this position, defendant relied

BellQf State vt Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1995),
State Vt RQkinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) and State
v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) (R. 80).
Relying on Zieglemari/ the trial court agreed with defendant
13

that Trooper Singleton could not infer from Cummings'
nervousness that defendant had committed or was about to
commit a crime, and, therefore, the trooper's questions
about whether there were weapons or contraband in the car
were improper (Memorandum Decision, R. 28-29).

However, the

court found that defendant's detention was justified by the
trooper's immediate discovery that defendant lacked both a
driver's license and registration,9 which under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1993), justified impounding and searching
the car (R. 27-29). 10

That finding was the sole basis for

the court's decision that the search was valid.

On appeal,

defendant totally fails to address this ground of the trial
court's ruling.
It is well established that this Court will not reject
a trial court's ruling that a defendant has failed to

9

£££ State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 (Utah
1995)(upholding reasonableness of arrest for driving with suspended
license); State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App.
1992)("After stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer
may '"briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants
while he
examines the vehicle registration and the driverfs license."'")
(citations omitted); cf. Provo City. 844 P.2d at 361 (officer's
request for driver's license and registration unchallenged during
community caretaker stop).
10

Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1) (a) (1993) provided that uany
peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take possession of
any vehicle . . . that is being operated with improper
registration." £££ State v, Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah
App. 1992)("Inventory searches of impounded vehicle's contents
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement . . . . " ) .
Section 41-la-1101 (l)(a) was amended and renumbered in 1996, and
now appears at subsection (1)(f)(i-iii), a more precise statement
of when defective registrations give rise to impoundment (see
Addendum A ) .
14

address on appeal.

Ziegleman, 905 P.2d at 885 (refusing to

consider the trial court's finding that a consent to search
was voluntary when it was unchallenged on appeal); State v.
Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(having "no
occasion to consider" the court's finding a roadblock legal
unchallenged by the defendant on appeal).

Because defendant

has not challenged the basis of the trial court's finding
that the search was justified, this Court should accept that
finding and, consequently, uphold the validity of the
search.11

CONCISION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm
defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/^

day of August, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

11

Similarly failing to regard the basis of the trial court's
suppression order, defendant argues at length that "the evidence
should have been suppressed because defendant's consent to search
was not voluntary and was obtained by exploitation of the prior
illegality." Aplt's Br. at Point III. However, the trial court
concluded that "[t]he trooper's improper question regarding weapons
or narcotics occurred after he already had legal authority to
search the vehicle. The validity of the consent is therefore not
at issue" (R. 29) (emphasis added). Thus, defendant attacks on
appeal a basis for suppression which the trial court did not even
rely on.
Since the State does not dispute the trial court's
conclusion, no argument regarding consent is necessary.
15

CERTIFICATE QF MAIfrlNC
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class,
postage prepaid, to Michael D. Bouwhuis, attorney for
defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd., Suite #102, Ogden, Utah
84401, this I,/

day of August, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

United States Constitution
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated
Section 41-6-61
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic the following provisions
apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as
practical entirely within a single lane and may
not be moved from the lane until the operator has
determined the movement can be made safely.
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and
providing for two-way movement of traffic, a
vehicle may not be operated in the center lane
except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle
traveling in the same direction, and when the
center lane is clear of traffic within a safe
distance; or
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left
turn or where the center lane is allocated
exclusively to traffic moving in the same
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the
allocation is designated by official
traffic-control devices.
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be
erected directing specified traffic to use a
designated lane or designating those lanes to be
used by traffic moving in a particular direction
regardless of the center of the roadway. Operators
of vehicles shall obey the directions of these
devices.
Section 41-6-182
(1) In this section "motor vehicle" has the same
meaning as provided in Section 41-6-148.20.
(2) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for
a child using a child restraint device, the driver

and front seat passengers of a motor vehicle
operated on a highway shall wear a properly
adjusted and fastened safety belt system that
meets standards set by the commissioner of the
Department of Public Safety.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for
a child using a child restraint device, the driver
of a motor vehicle shall secure, or cause to be
secured, a properly adjusted and fastened safety
seat belt system on any passenger in the front
seat who is younger than 18 years of age.
Section 41-la-1101
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a
warrant, may seize and take possession of any
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor:
(a) that the division or the peace officer has
reason to believe has been stolen;
(b) on which any identification number has been
defaced, altered, or obliterated;
(c) that has been abandoned on the public
highways;
(d) for which the applicant has written a check
for registration or title fees that has not been
honored by the applicant's bank and that is not
paid within 30 days;
(e) that is placed on the water with improper
registration; or
(f) that is being operated on a highway:
(i) with registration that has been
expired for more than three months;
(ii) having never been properly
registered by the current owner; or
(iii) with registration that is suspended
or revoked.
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a
seized vessel, the vessel's trailer may be seized
to transport and store the vessel.
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking
possession of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor
under this section shall immediately notify the
division of the action.
(4) A vehicle or vessel seized under this section
shall be moved by a peace officer or by a tow
truck that meets the standards established:
(a) by the Department of Public Safety under
Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b); and
(b) under Title 27, Chapter 17, Motor Carrier
Safety Act.

(5) (a) The commission shall make rules in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, setting standards
for impound yards that may be used by peace
officers and the division.
(b) The impound yard standards shall be equitable,
reasonable, and unrestrictive as to the number of
impound yards per geographical area.

ADDENDUM B

IN TEE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
JEFFREY L. CUMMINGS,
CHRISTIAN H. MAYFIELD

CASE NO. 951 - 119 FS
951 - 120 FS
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFJJELD

DEFENDANT.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motions to Suppress.
The Court heard evidence on December 6, 1995; and also viewed a video tape submitted into
evidence. The evidence indicates that on October 19, 1995, shortly after 2:00 pm, the
Highway Patrol Trooper was southbound on Interstate 15, near the Port of Entry. He
observed the Defendant's vehicle on the inside lane of traffic and observed that as the driver
attempted to put on his seat belt, the vehicle swerved or weaved over the fog line and then
back into the proper lane of traffic. The vehicle was stopped and the driver advised of the
danger of attaching a seat belt during the operation of a vehicle. The driver waralso
requested to produce a drivers license. The driver was unable to produce a license, and, in
fact, admitted that he had no valid license. He additionally advised the officer that he was

MICtOfflMffD
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required to report to jail later that same day on an unrelated offense. The Court finds that
the initial stop by the officer was justified, and that the continued detention was justified once
the officer learned the driver was operating the vehicle illegally.

In the recent case of State vs. Ziegleman. 276 Utah Advance Reports 56,
(October 26, 1995) f the Court cited a line of cases for the proposition that, under
circumstances quite similar to these, the Trooper's question whether any weapons or
narcotics were in the vehicle, was a violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights.
The facts in Ziegleman are remarkably similar to the present case. Defendant Ziegleman
was pulled over because the Trooper intended to issue a warning for speeding. Ziegleman
produced his driver's license but could not produce his registration. He appeared extremely
nervous. The Trooper asked if there were "any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle".
Defendant indicated he did not believe so. The Trooper then asked for permission to search
and the Defendant replied, "Help yourself". When the passenger exited the vehicle, he
"exhibited extreme nervousness". After a thorough search of the vehicle, a kilo of cocaine
was discovered under the hood of the car. The Court of Appeals in Ziegleman held that the
Trooper's question concerning weapons and narcotics violated the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, thereby negating the validity of the consent to search.

While the facts in the present case are very similar to the facts in Ziegleman, the
Court finds the following facts to be significant and distinguishing from Ziegleman:
1.

The driver, Mayfield, did not have a valid driver's license, nor was he able to
produce any evidence, of registratioiL.

2.

The items seized were located in the passenger portion of the vehicle primarily
on or between the front seats.

Memorandum Decision
Civil No. 951 -119 and 951 -120
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These facts are significant because they establish that the officer had a legal basis for
impounding the vehicle, (lack of driver's license or registration). The fact that he testified
he may have been willing to allow the passenger to drive the vehicle away does not negate
his legal authority to impound the vehicle and thereafter conduct an inventory search.
(41 - la-1101) The Court also finds it significant that the items seized were in the front
passenger and driver area of the vehicle, the same area where one might logically expect to
locate registration papers. This type of search was much less invasive than the search in
Ziegleman where contraband was ultimately located next to the battery under the hood of the
vehicle.

The Trooper's improper question regarding weapons or narcotics occurred after he
already had legal authority to search the vehicle. The validity of the consent is therefore not
at issue. Both the stop and search conducted by the officer were legal and satisfy the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Defendant's Motions To Suppress are denied.
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